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I. INTRODUCTION
The right of persons in custody to consult with counsel was the
subject of Dickerson v. United States, a much anticipated opinion by
the United States Supreme Court decided during the 1999-2000
term. In Dickerson, the Court clearly established that the warnings
required by the Miranda v. Arizona' opinion and the right to con-
sult with counsel prior to custodial interrogation were of constitu-
- Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. B.S. Bradley University, J.D.
IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1979; Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law,
1979-80, University of Chicago Law School, 1970. The author wishes to acknowl-
edge the assistance of Ms. Darlajo Boggs, in the preparation of this article.
1. Dickerson v. United States, __ U.S. -_, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tional dimension. The right of persons in custody to consult with
counsel was also an important question in the State of Minnesota
during the last year in both the courts and the Legislature.
During the past year, three apparently separate (but actually
closely intertwined) developments occurred that will shape the con-
tours of the application of Miranda and Dickerson in Minnesota for
years to come. In chronological sequence, the first development
was a very high profile Goodhue County trial court ruling in
Minnesota v. Jenson, which suppressed a confession taken by an FBI
agent, as required by both Miranda and Dickerson, because tape re-
cordings, required under the Minnesota Constitution, revealed that
the FBI agent had ignored numerous requests to speak to an attor-
ney. Subsequently, a special prosecutor announced that, even
though there had been numerous requests for counsel that had
been ignored, the FBI agent had not violated any laws for which he
could be held liable and the matter dropped from public view.'
The second development occurred when the Department of
Corrections successfully lobbied the Minnesota Legislature to
amend Minnesota Statute section 481.10, an 1887 statute that had
been used by a pro se inmate plaintiff, Ronaldo Ligons, to hold the
Department of Corrections liable for $100 for refusing his request
to speak with his lawyer.6
The third development was a ruling by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals on September 5, 2000, in Mullins v. Churchill 7 (an appeal
arising from the pro se case against the Department of Corrections,
mentioned above) in which a Minnesota court made clear for the
first time that (1) criminal penalties apply under Minnesota Statute
section 481.10 for law enforcement officials who violate rights set
out in Miranda and reinforced in Dickerson, and (2) an action for a
separate, statutory civil remedy can be brought by the person whose
3. Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2330-36.
4. Infra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
5. Infra notes 170-177 and accompanying text.
6. MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1998) (amended 2000 MINN. LAws ch. 408, S.F.
3108, April 14, 2000); Appellant's Opening Brief at A2; Mullins v. Churchill, 616
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (referring to Ronaldo Ligons v. David Crist,
(Washington Cty. Ct., Minn. Mar. 3, 1999) (Conciliation Ct. No. 55-98-1899)).
The statute at issue was amended during the 2000 Legislature session and now
"provides that inmates in state correctional facilities shall have telephone access to
legal counsel 'following the request of the person restrained and in accordance
with policies adopted by the institution that meet constitutional requirements."
Mullins v. Churchill, 616 N.W.2d 764, 767 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
7. 616 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
(Vol. 27:2
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 55
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/55
MIRANDA IN MINNESOTA
right to consult with counsel has been violated.
Part II of this article reviews the history of Minnesota Statute
section 481.10 and its interpretation by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, which creates an "absolute duty" for law enforcement offi-
cers to respond to requests for counsel, s and which imposes crimi-
nal and civil sanctions for violations.9 Part III analyzes Mullins v.
Churchill 10 and demonstrates that, even though the Court of Ap-
peals was incorrect in holding that the Department of Corrections
attorney access policies did not violate the requirements of Minne-
sota Statute section 481.10, the Court was absolutely correct in con-
cluding that law enforcement officials in Minnesota are subject to
separate and independent criminal and civil penalties under the
statute. Part IV compares the original statute ruled upon by the
Court of Appeals with the language in recent amendments' and
demonstrates that, with the possible exception of the Department
of Corrections, these penalties continue to apply to all law en-
forcement officials in Minnesota under the new provisions of
481.10. Part V examines Minnesota v. Jenson,12 the case mentioned
above involving an errant FBI agent, to illustrate how Minnesota
Statute section 481.10 interacts with Miranda, Dickerson and the
Minnesota Constitution, 3 and demonstrates that the failure to
prosecute the FBI agent and other law enforcement officials who
violated the defendant's right to consult with counsel was a policy
decision that is not supported by Minnesota law.14 The Jenson case
also illustrates the importance of the Court of Appeals decision in
Mullins v. Churchill, which clearly established that civil remedies
under Minnesota Statute section 481.10 may be pursued, irrespec-
tive of a criminal prosecution or conviction as an alternative means
of enforcing the rights enunciated in Miranda and Dickerson.'
5
The article concludes that the criminal and civil penalties im-
posed by Minnesota Statute section 481.10, combined with Minne-
sota Constitutional requirements that confessions be recorded to
be admissible in court, provide the nation's most effective and
8. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 1.
9. Id. at subd. 4.
10. 616 N.W.2d 764.
11. Infra notes 143, 145, 150, and 158 and accompanying text.
12. Infra notes 159 and accompanying text.
13. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (requiring "[in all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right...to have the assistance of counsel in his defense").
14. Infra notes 159 and accompanying text.
15. Mullins v. Churchill, 616 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
2000]
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comprehensive enforcement mechanism of Miranda and Dickerson
that should serve as a model for other jurisdictions.1
6
II. MINNESOTA STATUTE SECTION 481.10 AND THE RIGHT To
CONSULT WITH COUNSEL
In Minnesota the right to consult with counsel is not only pro-
tected by the requirements of Miranda, Dickerson and the Minnesota
Constitution's right to remain silent and right to counsel, the right
to consult with an attorney is also protected by Minnesota Statute
section 481.10. Originally enacted in 1887, Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 481.10 creates criminal and civil penalties for law enforcement
officials who fail to honor a request for a lawyer. 7 Although this
statute had previously been the basis for Minnesota Supreme Court
rulings establishing the right to consult with an attorney prior to
being questoned and prior to taking a blood alcohol test, before
the Court of Appeals decided Mullins v. Churchill, there had been
no reported cases in which Minnesota Statute section 481.10 had
ever been invoked as the basis for criminal or civil liability. At the
time Mr. Ligons, the original plaintiff in Mullins, filed his claim in
1999 the statute read as follows:
All officers or persons having in their custody a person re-
strained of liberty, except in cases where imminent danger
or escape exists, shall admit any attorney retained by or in
behalf of the person restrained, or whom the restrained
person may desire to consult, to a private interview at the
place of custody. Such custodians, upon request of the
person restrained, as soon as practicable, and before
other proceedings shall be had, shall notify the attorney of
the request for consultation with the attorney. At all times
through the period of custody, whether or not the person
restrained has been charged, tried, convicted, or is serving
an executed sentence, reasonable telephone access to the
attorney shall be provided to the person restrained at no
charge to the attorney or to the person restrained. Every
officer or person who shall violate any provision of this section
16. MINN. STAT. § 481.10; see also State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.
1994) (requiring electronic recording of all custodial interrogation and question-
ing); Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 767 (validating civil penalty for non-compliance).
17. State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 1944).
18. Id.
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shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, in addition to the punish-
ment prescribed therefor shallfofeit $100 to the person aggrieved,
to be recovered in a civil action.u
A. The History Of Minnesota Statute Section 481.10
Long before the United States Supreme Court began describ-
ing the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Federal
Court in 1938 in Johnson v. Zerbst,21 and almost 100 years before the
Supreme Court's 1966 Miranda opinion established a right to con-
sult an attorney in custody situations,2 the Minnesota Legislature
enacted a statute that reflected a recognition of the importance of
allowing persons in custody to consult with counsel. The language
of the original statute, and the seriousness of penalties established
for violation of the statute, create a strong inference that the 1887
Legislature 23 was motivated by many of the same concerns ex-
pressed in Miranda regarding the inherent vulnerability of persons
in custody. 24
The language of the original statute specifically links the right
to consult with counsel with "custody,"2 5 the same requirement that
is one of the necessary preconditions that triggers the Miranda
warnings and the related right to consult with counsel before being
26questioned. The original Minnesota Statute section 481.10 also
required law enforcement officers to contact counsel at the request
of the "person restrained."2 7 It takes little imagination to conclude
that over 100 years ago the Minnesota Legislature understood that
contact with an attorney, upon request, may be the only means of
giving realistic protection to the rights of persons who are under•. 28
the complete control of government entities. This, of course, was
the central thrust of the "presumption of coercion" arising from
20. MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
21. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
23. Friedman v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991)
(discussing right to counsel created by 1887 statute).
24. Id. at 832.
25. State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 1944) (stating MINN. STAT. §
481.10 "requires an officer having an accused in custody to grant a request for an
interview with his counsel, and he shall notify such counsel 'as soon as practicable,
and before other proceedings shall be had.").
26. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
27. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 481.10, which had
been the law in Minnesota since 1887).
28. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d at 588.
2000]
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the fact of "custody" to which Miranda was directed,' 9 and which the
United States Supreme Court felt compelled to conclude was of
constitutional dimension in Dickerson.
The seriousness of the penalties imposed by the Legislature on
governmental officials who ignored a request to consult with coun-
sel reveal the seriousness with which the Minnesota Legislature ap-
proached the right of persons in custody to consult with counsel.
In 1887, a time when the suppression of evidence as a remedy for
government misconduct had just been introduced in Supreme
Court jurisprudence in Boyd v. United States,"' and over 100 years be-
fore the Supreme Court clearly established that the right of those
in custody to consult with counsel was of constitutional dimension
in Dickerson,3 2 the Minnesota Legislature imposed remedies that
may be even more effective than mere suppression of evidence:
criminal and civil penalties levied directly against the offending of-
ficials.3"
The penalty clause of the statute has remained essentially un-
changed after more than 100 years. By providing for misdemeanor
criminal penalties, the Legislature served notice on law enforce-
ment officials that failure to contact an attorney upon the request
carried the potential of the loss of their own freedom, not merely
the loss of evidence. Moreover, the $100 civil penalty was also a
statement of the seriousness with which the Legislature approached
the access to counsel question. The $100 civil penalty imposed by
the Lefslature in 1887 would be worth more than $1700 at current
value.
Between 1887 and 1991, Minnesota Statute section 481.10 re-
mained largely unchanged through numerous revisions of Minne-
sota Criminal Codes. 5 The first case to construe the statute was de-
29. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-57.
30. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
31. 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (dictum).
32. Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2336.
33. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 4 (2000) (penalty clause).
34. THE VALUE OF A DOLLAR (Scott Derks ed., Grey House Publishing, Lake-
ville, Conn. 1999) (stating in constant dollar terms the value of $1.00 in 1887 is
worth $17.43 in 1999).
35. MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (Supp 1999) (amended by 2000 Minn. Sess. Law.
408). Prior historical amendments and derivations include the following:
amended by Laws 1992, c. 571, art. 15, § 3; amended by Laws 1991, c. 345, art. 1,
§101; St. 1927, § 5692; Gen. St. 1923, § 5692; Gen. St. 1913, § 4952; Rev. Laws
1905, § 2285; Gen. St. 1894, §§ 6187 to 6189; Laws 1887, c. 187, § 1 to 3. Id. See
also State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 1944); Prideaux v. Minn. Dep't
[Vol. 27:2
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cided in 1944. In State v. Schabert,16 the Minnesota Supreme Court
interpreted the "before other proceedings shall be had" language
in Minnesota Statute section 481.10 to create a Miranda-like right to
consult with counsel before being interrogated.3' The statute was
next mentioned in 1971 in a dissenting opinion by Justice Otis, who
was joined by Justices Rogosheske and Kelly in State v. Palmer. Jus-
tice Otis wrote that pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 481.10
"arresting officers had an absolute duty to notify defendant's lawyer
of his request for consultation"" in a case involving intoxication
testing. The applicability of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 had
not been raised in the court below, and the majority did not com-
ment on the reasoning of the dissent.
40
Although persons in custody for purposes of taking a blood al-
cohol test did not have a right to consult with counsel under Mi-
randa because such testing did not constitute "interrogation, ' 41 the
dissent in Palmer suggested that, under Minnesota Statute section
481.10, such persons had an absolute statutory right to consult with
counsel. In Prideaux v. Minnesota Department of Public Safety,43 de-
cided in 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted Justice Otis'
reasoning in Palmer and held that the "absolute duty" created by
Minnesota Statute section 481.10 required officers to notify persons
in custody that they had a right to consult with counsel before
taking a blood alcohol test. The Court also held that the right to
speak with a lawyer "at the place of custody" could be met by allow-
ing the person in custody to have access to a telephone to call an
attorney. "The right to counsel will be considered vindicated if the
person is provided with a telephone....
of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 391-93 (Minn. 1976) (discussing the historical sig-
nificance of the statute, dating back to 1887).
36. 15 N.W.2d at 585.
37. Id. at 589.
38. 191 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1971).
39. Id. at 191 (Otis, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (RogosheskeJ., dissenting).
41. Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 773 (1966) (Warren,J., dissenting).
42. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d at 191.
43. 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976).
44. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 391-92.
45. Id. at 394. The court noted that changes in technology that had occurred
since Minnesota Statute section 481.10 was enacted allowed methods of communi-
cation that could not have been anticipated at that time, and that telephone con-
tact with counsel would adequately protect the interests to which Minnesota Stat-
ute section 481.10 was directed. Id.
2000]
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In 1976, the Court also decided State v. Held,46 a case that held
that the right to consult an attorney by phone, described in
Prideaux, need not be made from a private room, but that any in-
formation gleaned from overhearing the call could not be used by
the government. In 1977, the scope of the rights created by Min-
nesota Statute section 481.10 was again addressed by the Supreme
Court in Minnesota Deptartment of Public Safety v. Kneisl17 which held
that the right to consult with counsel was not "vindicated" by allow-
ing a phone call, if the attorney who arrived at the jail pursuant to
that phone call was denied access to person in custody. However,
the Court also held that the "private interview" mentioned in Min-
nesota Statute section 481.10 need not take place in a private room,
but that it may take place in an area "out of the earshot of offi-
,,48
cers.
In 1990, the Minnesota Legislature responded to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's interpretation of Minnesota Statute section
481.10 in Prideaux by amending the implied consent statute by ex-
plicitly eliminating the right to consult with counsel in implied
consent settings. The amended statute explicitly stated that there
was no right to consult with counsel prior to blood alcohol testing
for license revocation purposes under the amended statute. A li-
cense revocation case in which the conflict between Minnesota
Statute section 481.10 and the implied consent statute reached the
Minnesota Su reme Court in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public
Safety in 1991.
46. 246 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1976).
47. 251 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1977).
48. Kneisl, at 649.
49. Friedman v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 841-42 (Minn.
1991).
50. Id. at 831-32. In Friedman, the Supreme Court found that the Legisla-
ture's attempts to eliminate the right to consult with counsel, originally described
in Minn. Stat. 481.10, was of constitutional dimension under the right to counsel
provisions of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. Thus, although chemical testing was
neither a critical stage under the Sixth Amendment nor subject to the protections
of Miranda, the Court found that chemical testing was a "critical stage" under Art.
1, Sec. 6 of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
reviewed the particular solicitude with which the right to consult with counsel has
been treated in Minnesota, including a reference to Minnesota Statute section
481.10. Id. at 829, 831-32. In the most recent opinion citing Minnesota Statute
section 481.10, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statutory right to
counsel created in Minnesota Statute section 481.10 did not, standing alone, also
create a right to an attorney at government expense. State v. White, 504, N.W.2d
211, 214 (Minn. 1991). In this respect the rights created under the statute differ
from Miranda and Dickerson. Id.
[Vol. 27:2
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In Friedman, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that
the Legislature had explicitly rejected its interpretation of Minne-
sota Statute section 481.10 because the language of the implied
consent statute, on its face, rejected the Court's interpretation of
the statutory right to counsel in Prideaux. However, the Court con-
cluded that the statutory right to counsel described in Prideaux was
also a right of constitutional dimension under the right to counsel
provisions of Article 1, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution.51
Although chemical testing is not a critical stage under cases de-
cided by the U.S. Supreme Court,52 the Minnesota Court held that
it was a critical stage under the Minnesota Constitution and the
implied consent statute was declared unconstitutional. In the
most recent opinion citing Minnesota Statute section 481.10, State
54
v. White, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statutory
right to counsel created in Minnesota Statute section 481.10 did
not, standing alone, also create a right to an attorney at govern-
ment expense. Between 1991 and August 5, 2000, when the Court
of Appeals decided Mullins v. Churchill, Minnesota Statute section
481.10 has not been interpreted in any other reported opinions.
B. The 1991 Amendment To Minnesota Statute Section 481.10
In 1991, the Legislature enacted the first major amendment to
the 100 year old statute by adding language that closely tracked the
construction of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 that had been
adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Prideaux and its prog-
eny. An "attorney telephone access" clause was inserted between
the clause that created the "absolute duty" to contact counsel to ar-
range an in person consultation 55 and the penalty clause. The
1991 "telephone access clause" amendment reads as follows:
At all times through the period of custody, whether or not
the person restrained has been charged, tried, convicted,
or is serving an executed sentence, reasonable telephone
access to the attorney shall be provided to the person re-
strained at no charge to the attorney or to the person re-
51. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833 (citing United States. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
52. Supra note 51.
53. Id. at 833-834.
54. 504 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 1993).
55. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 1 (Supp. 1999) (citing 1991 amendment); see
also Prideaux v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 393 (Minn. 1976).
20001
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S 56
strained.
On its face, the amendment appears to codify the construction
of the previous clause by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Prideaux,
that not only recognized that the duty to allow attorney consulta-
,,57 ,58tion "as soon as practicable following a request was "absolute,
but established that the duty could be "vindicated" by providing
telephone access in lieu of "a private interview at the place of cus-"59
tody. The Supreme Court had also determined that this tele-
phone access was "reasonable," if the call was made "out of the ear-
shot" of law enforcement officials6° during a time period that would
61not defeat the effectiveness of the blood alcohol test.
In the 1991 amendment, the Legislature made clear that the
right to consult with counsel under the statute was much broader
than that established by the United States Supreme Court under
either the Sixth Amendment,62 or the Fifth Amendment. 63 The
statutory right to attorney telephone access arose "whether or not the
person restrained has been charged, tried, convicted, or is serving an exe-
cuted sentence." 6 In addition, the Legislature made explicit what
was implicit in Prideaur the "absolute duty"65 of governmental offi-,,. 66
cials to contact an attorney "as soon as practicable,6  or to make a
telephone available for a person in custody to do so, exists "[a] t all
56. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 391-93.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 394. Some 15 years before the Legislature added the "telephone
access" clause, the Minnesota Supreme Court had observed that Minnesota Statute
section 481.10 had been enacted long before telephones had become common,
and that there was no point in requiring law enforcement officials to arrange a
personal consultation, at least with respect to blood alcohol testing, when a private
telephone consultation would accomplish the apparent result intended by the
Legislature in enacting Minnesota Statute section 481.10.
60. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Kneisl, 251 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Minn. 1977).
61. Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 415-17, 247 N.W.2d at 391-93.
62. Under the Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel arises only at "critical
stages" which typically occur after the "initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings." Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980); see also Maine. v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
63. Under the Fifth Amendment, custody alone is not sufficient to trigger the
right to consult with counsel. The right to consult with counsel arises only if law
enforcement officials wish to interrogate a suspect. Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S.
436, 467-73 (1966).
64. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 1 (Supp. 1999) (citing 1991 amendment).








times through the period of custody....
As Prideaux made clear, a request for an attorney under the
original language of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 required one
of two mandatory responses: (1) notifying an attorney "as soon as
practicable and before other proceedings shall be had"68 that a per-. 69
sonal consultation has been requested and admitting that attorney
to a private interview out of the "earshot" of law enforcement, or
(2) in lieu of a private interview, facilitating a telephone call to the
70
attorney in a setting in which the conversation would not easily be
overheard by law enforcement.7' The 1991 amendment retained
this language en toto.
Thus, when the 1991 amendment referred to "reasonable tele-
phone access to an attorney... at no charge to the attorney or the
person restrained," 7z the Legislature actually expanded the "abso-
lute duty" to grant telephone access established in Prideaux 7 by
making clear that financial limitations could not be imposed on the
caller or the recipient of the call. 4 The only legislative history that
exists is committee hearings in which the cost of Department of
Corrections policy that allowed only collect phone calls to attorneys
was discussed as the reason for the amendment.75 There is little
support for the conclusion that "reasonable" telephone access
mentioned in the 1991 amendment was intended to create com-
plete discretion to refuse to allow telephone calls that were clearly
mandated by Prideaux.76
67. Id.
68. State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 1944).
69. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 391-92.
70. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Kneisl, 251 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Minn. 1977);
see also State v. Held, 246 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. 1976).
71. Held, 311 Minn. at 76, 246 N.W.2d at 864; Kneisl, 312 Minn. at 415-16, 251
N.W.2d at 649.
72. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 1 (Supp. 1999) (citing 1991 amendment).
73. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 392-93.
74. The legislative history cited by the trial court confirms that the Legislature
intended to remove costs for making the mandatory phone calls and to require
the Department of Corrections to eliminate collect calls charged to inmates or
attorneys. Infra note 96 and accompanying text.
75. Infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. Id. The sort of explicit statement of legislative intent that would be re-
quired to set aside statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court is evidenced in
the amendment to Minnesota Statute section 481.10 that became effective August
1, 2000, which explicitly exempted Department of Corrections Officials from
criminal and civil liability under Minnesota Statute section 481.10. Id. It also dif-
fers from the explicit Legislative action, taken in response to Prideaux, which ex-
plicitly sought to eliminate the statutory right to consult with counsel through the
2000]
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III. MULLINS V. CHURCHILL
Ronaldo Ligons, an inmate serving a sentence in a Department
of Corrections facility who was involved in a number of legal pro-
ceedings,77 wished to consult privately with his attorneys on a num
ber of occasions. Although it is possible for, inmates to use pay
telephones, if there are sufficient funds in the inmates telephone
account, all calls made from the pay telephones in DOC facilities
are subject to being monitored at any time7 9 and the monitored
conversations are not protected by attorney-client privilege.80 The
DOC policy does permit inmates to make telephone calls to attor-
neys free of charge, but these attorney calls can be made only upon
a written request being submitted to a case manager in which the
inmate must describe why the inmate cannot use the mail, and the
case manager has complete discretion to deny the request to con-
sult with counsel."'
Rather than making monitored calls from the pay phones, Mr.
Ligons submitted a number of written requests to his case manager• 82
for free, confidential attorney telephone calls. The requests were
summarily denied because Mr. Ligons failed to provide sufficient
information to satisfy the caseworker that he could not accomplish
his objectives via the U.S. Mail as was required by Department of
Corrections telephone policy. 8 3 He objected to the denial of his
requests for telephone calls to counsel and was informed that, not-
withstanding the language of Minnesota Statute section 481.10, the
amendment of the implied consent statute. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 393-94.
77. Mullins v. Churchill, 616 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
78. Appellant's Opening Br. at A2, A8-17, A32, Mullins, 616 N.W.2d 764 (re-
ferring to Amended Conciliation Court Statement of Claim, Ronaldo Ligons v. Crist,
(Wash. Cty. Minn. Mar. 3, 1999) (Conciliation Ct. No. S5-98-1899)).
79. Id. at A94-96 (referring to Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, Div. Directive
302.210 (July 1, 1999)). The Court of Appeals opinion in Mullins quoted the rele-
vant portion of the DOC telephone policy stating:
When legal business cannot be accomplished by U.S. mail, an offender
may request an approved telephone contact with an attorney. Desig-
nated staff will review the call for approval. Staff will place the call and
verify that the requested party is available and willing to accept the call.
Telephones for approved legal calls will not be subject to any monitoring
activity. The facility will not charge offenders for approved legal calls.
Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 768 (citing Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, Div. Directive
302.210, § B(4) (July 1, 1999).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83. Appellant's Opening Br. at A32, Mullins, 616 N.W.2d 764.
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Department of Corrections personnel had complete discretion to
deny his requests.84 As a result, he filed a pro se complaint in Wash-
ington County Conciliation Court against the warden of Stillwater
Penitentiary for $300 in statutory damages under Minnesota Statute
section 481.10 for three separate violations of the statute."
5
Mr. Ligons represented himself, as is required under Concilia-
8t 6
tion Court rules, but the court permitted the warden to be repre
sented by counsel for the Department of Corrections. Both par-
ties submitted written arguments, and on May 17, 1999, the court
issued a $100judgment in favor of Mr. Ligons on one of his claims
under Minnesota Statute section 481.10.8g In spite of its long his-
tory, and the litigation described above, this may have been the first
time any Minnesota Court had been presented with claims under
Minnesota Statute section 481.10, and it is the first judgment ren-
dered in favor of a plaintiff.89 This single Conciliation Court award
called into question the attorney telephone access policy that had
been promulgated by the Department of Corrections following the
1991 amendment of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 and the De-
partment filed for a trial de novo in District Court in Washington
County. 90
After the case was transferred to the District Court, the Minne-
sota Civil Liberties Union entered the case on behalf of Mr. Li-
84. Id. at A17 (referring to Minnesota Correctional Facility-Stillwater, Policy
& Procedure T-1, § IV (B), Legal Calls (Dec. 31, 1998)). The Court of Appeals in
Mullins quoted the relevant telephone policies from the Stillwater correctional
facility stating:
In situations where phone contact is necessary, the inmate shall send a
kite to his Case Manager 24 hours in advance of the requested call. The
request must include the name of the attorney, the phone number and a
specific explanation of why this communication cannot be handled
through the U.S. mail. Approval of requests are at the discretion of the
inmate's Case Manager.
Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 769 (citing Minnesota Correctional Facility-Stillwater, Pol-
icy T-1, § IV(B) (Dec. 31, 1998)).
85. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86. Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 769. Ligons signed the conciliation court docu-
ment representing himself pro se. Id.
87. Appellant's Opening Br. atA50-51, Mullins, 616 N.W.2d 764.
88. Id. at A48-49 (referring to judge Thomas G. Armstrong's Order dated
May 17, 1999 andjudgment filed onJune 10, 1999, awarding Ligons $100).
89. Id.
90. Id. at A50-51, A67-87 (referring to Minnesota Department of Correction's
Demand for Removal/Appeal, datedjune 10, 1999, and subsequent Motion to Dis-
miss or for Summary Judgment, dated Nov. 5, 1999).
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gons and the Office of the Attorney General entered an appear-
ance on behalf of the DOC.9' The District Court granted the de-
fendant's Motion for Summary Judgment9 s holding that the $100
civil remedy under Minnesota Statute section 481.10 was only avail-
able following a conviction under the criminal penalty clause of the
statute, likening the civil remedy to a "forfeiture" which must be
preceded by a criminal conviction. The court also stated the De-
partment of Corrections policies limiting telephone access to at-
torneys were reasonable under the "reasonable telephone access to
attorneys" clause in light of the defendants' security concerns and
the availability of mail communication as an alternative, if the re-
quest to consult with counsel by telephone is denied.
9 5
The court also referred to the legislative history of the 1991
amendment which indicated that, prior to the amendment, "many
jails required inmates to contact their attorneys by collect calls on a11. 1 ,,96
public phone and that the high cost of these collect calls to
county funded public defenders "unnecessarily exacerbated" public
97expenditures. According to the trial court opinion "[t] he reason-
able telephone access" provision of Minnesota Statute section
481.10 was enacted in 1991 to reduce taxpayer expense in response
to the inmate-attorney telephone policy of some jail officials. 
9 8
The trial court opinion was correct, insofar as the legislative history
is concerned, but the court failed to cite Prideaux, or any of the
other Minnesota Supreme Court cases that had construed Minne-
sota Statute section 481.10 to create an "absolute duty" to allow a
"private interview," or a telephone call to an attorney, upon re-
quest,9 9 and plaintiff Ligons appealed.
The decision in Mullins v. Churchill was issued by the Court of
91. Along with James Manahan and Teresa Nelson, the author was co-counsel
of record on behalf of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union.
92. Supra note 78, at A50-51, A67-87 (noting attorney of record listed as Paul
Merwin, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Minnesota).
93. Id. at A199-210 (referring to Ligons v. Christ (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2000) (No.
C3-99-3077) (Court Order granting the DOC summaryjudgment))."
94. Id. at A205-06.
95. Id. at A207.
96. Id. (citing Act of June 1, 1991, ch. 345, art. 1, § 101, 1991, Minn. Laws
2645; Transcript of Senate Judiciary Committee, Civil Law Division Testimony of
the Honorable Kevin Burke (March 26, 1991) at 3; Transcript of House Judiciary
Committee of the Honorable Judge Burke (April 8, 1991) at 3).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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Appeals on September 5, 2000.10 On the issue of the availability of
criminal and civil penalties under Minnesota Statute section
481.10, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. 10' The Court
of Appeals distinguished Minnesota forfeiture statutes from the
provisions of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 on the grounds that
civil forfeitures allow the government to attach assets related to
criminal prosecutions and that
"[u]nlike the criminal [-civil] forfeiture statutes cited by
the district court, the plain language of Minnesota Statute
481.10 does not state that a criminal conviction is a pre-
requisite to a civil penalty... [i]nstead it prescribes both
criminal and civil remedies; neither of which is a prereq-
uisite to the other." 102
The court noted that the language of Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 481.10 was identical to the statute that imposes criminal liabil-
ity and treble civil damages for attorney fraud and that
[n] either this court nor the supreme court has ever stated
that a criminal conviction is required before permitting
recovery of treble damages under Minn. Stat. §§ 481.07,
.071 .... Therefore, we conclude that the district court
erred when it determined that a civil recovery is not avail-
able under Minn. Stat. § 481.10 absent a criminal convic-
tion.
10 3
Although the Court of Appeals upheld Ligons' standing to
bring a civil action independent of the criminal sanction for viola-
tions of the statute, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court
finding that the DOC regulations were reasonable under the "rea-
sonable telephone access" clause of Minnesota Statute section
481.10 as a matter of law. °4 The court did not address plaintiff's
argument that providing telephone access is mandatory under
Prideaux, in lieu of the "absolute duty" to contact an attorney and
arrange "a private interview at the place of custody. °5 Nor did the
court address the argument that the 1991 "reasonable telephone
access" amendment must be read in light of existing Supreme
Court doctrine that allows "private" phone calls to be made "out of
100. Mullins v. Churchill, 616 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
101. Id. at 766.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 768.
104. Id.
105. Prideaux. v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 415-17, 247
N.W.2d 385, 391-93 (Minn. 1976).
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earshot" during a reasonable period of time, 10 6 and the language of
the statute that requires that attorney access must occur "as soon as
practicable."'07 The Court of Appeals cited no cases in support of
its conclusion that, "[t]he statute, by definition, allows for discre-
tion. '08
Further, the court found that requiring inmates to justify why
they cannot use the mail to contact their attorneys is not unreason-
able; 10 limiting attorney phone calls only to those related to court
dates or filing deadlines is not unreasonable and does not interfere
with an inmate's right to talk confidentially to an attorney because
these dates "are a matter of public record;"" 0 and, that the DOC
policies are reasonable under Minnesota Statute section 481.10
given DOC security and management concerns. The court
reached this conclusion even though "imminent danger of escape"
is the only proper basis to deny attorney access specifically men-
tioned in Minnesota Statute section 481.10,"' and the court did not
refer to Prideaux, Held, Kneisl or any other caselaw to support its
analysis. 1
IV. ANALYSIS OF MULLINS V. CHURCHILL
In light of the Court of Appeals failure to address the Minne-
sota Supreme Court opinion in Prideaux which has very clearly es-
tablished that telephone access to counsel is mandatory, in lieu of
contacting an attorney and allowing a private consultation at the
prison," 4 it appears that the Court of Appeals opinion directly con-
travenes well established Supreme Court doctrine. Further, by fail-
106. Id.
107. Id.





113. Id. at 768-69. The Mullins opinion also held that there was no issue of
material fact and that a Motion for Summary Judgment on the question of the
"reasonableness" of the Department of Corrections could be determined as a mat-
ter of law. Id. The Court also held that the First and Sixth Amendment claims of
plaintiff need not be decided because they were not raised below. Id. Although
the trial record reveals that both of these conclusions are subject to challenge,
these issues are beyond the scope of this article. Supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
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ing to read the "reasonable telephone access to attorneys" clause in
the 1991 amendment in a manner that is consistent with "reason-
able" but mandatory telephone access under the unamended por-
tions of the statute, established by the Supreme Court in Prideaux115
and Held,'16 the Court of Appeals opinion concluded that the Legis-
lature intended to contravene well established Supreme Court doc-
trine without explicitly stating that purpose, and without any legis-
lative history to support such an intention."7
The legislative history cited by the trial court, which was not re-
ferred to by the Court of Appeals opinion, does not support the
reading of the "reasonable telephone access" amendment ad-
vanced by the Court of Appeals.' 8 The legislative history clearly
shows that there was no discussion of altering existing Supreme
Court doctrine regarding the mandatory nature of attorney phone
calls. Rather, adding the "reasonable telephone access" was in-
tended to give full effect to Prideaux by lowering unnecessary costs
to counties by eliminating collect calls and shifting the costs to the
Department of Corrections and private attorneys who receive the
calls mandated by Prideaux."9 These issues will have to be ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court to prevent the Court of Appeals
from effectively overruling Pideaux and its progeny.
However, the erroneous interpretation of the "reasonable ac-
cess to attorney clause" notwithstanding, the portion of the opinion
that addressed the availability of remedies is likely to prove to have
a significant impact on the conduct of custodial interrogations, and
the ability of the courts of Minnesota to enforce the constitutional
requirements of Miranda and Dickerson.10 For the first time since
Minnesota Statute section 481.10 was originally enacted in 1887, a
Minnesota court has clearly ruled that law enforcement officials,
other than those covered by DOC policies, who violate their "abso-
lute duty" to (1) inform persons in custody of their right to consult1 021
with counsel (Prideaux), (2) contact attorneys for "reasonably"
115. Id.
116. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Held, 246 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. 1976)
(stating telephone access, in lieu of a private consultation in the prison, is manda-
tory on request, but does not require separate rooms for telephone calls).
117. Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 768-69.
118. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
119. Id. (discussing cost effective measures).
120. Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 768-69.
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private consultations in jails (Kneisl) 1 2 or, in the alternative (3) to
provide prompt access to a telephone to contact an attorney
(Prideaux) 12 in a "reasonably" confidential setting (Held), are sub-
ject to criminal prosecution. Further, even if law enforcement offi-
cials choose not to commence a criminal action against one of their
own, Mullins v. Churchill establishes that private individuals have an
independent civil action for statutory damages.
The Court of Appeals opinion in this regard was compelled by
the plain language of Minnesota Statute section 481.10:
Every officer or person who shall violate any provision of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, in addi-
tion to the punishment described therefor shall forfeit $100 to
the person aggrieved, to be recovered in a civil action.
126
Although this is the first time this section of Minnesota Statute
section 481.10 has been construed, the court was correct in noting
that, with respect to the relationship between the criminal sanction
and the civil remedy, Minnesota Statute section 481.10 makes use
of exactly the same language as Minnesota Statute section 481.07,
.071,127 the statute that exposes attorneys who commit fraud to
criminal sanctions, and to a separate and independent civil cause of
action brought by the person harmed:
An attorney who, with intent to deceive a court or a party
to an action or judicial proceeding, is guilty of or consents
to any deceit or collusion, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor; and, in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor,
the attorney shall be liable to the party injured in treble
damages.
128 -
According to the Court of Appeals, "[n] either this court nor
the supreme court has ever stated that a criminal conviction is re-
122. Minn. Dept of Pub. Safety v. Kneisl, 312 Minn. 281, 281, 251 N.W.2d 645,
646 (1977).
123. Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 421, 247 N.W.2d at 394.
124. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Held, 311 Minn. 74, 76, 246 N.W.2d 863,
864 (1976).
125. Mullins, 616 N.W.2d 768 (citing MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1998)).
126. Id. at 767 n.2 (citing MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1998) (emphasis added)).
Within footnote two the court noted this particular section of the statute had re-
cently been amended by the 2000 legislative session. Id. The amendment ex-
empts the DOC and its officers and employees from penalties. Id. But the court
added that because the Mullins action was commenced prior to the effective date
of the amendments, the amendments did not apply. Id.
127. Id. at 767.
128. Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 481.07 (1998) (emphasis added).
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quired before permitting the recovery of treble damages under
Minnesota Statute section 481.07, .071.,,129 The court was correct in
this regard. To reach a contrary conclusion with respect to Minne-
sota Statute section 481.10, it would be necessary to conclude that
no attorney could be sued for treble damages for fraud unless that
attorney had already been criminally prosecuted and convicted.
This would, in many cases, have the effect of insulating attorneys
from being held liable for money damages for committing fraud,
and would make it extremely difficult for clients to receive recom-
pense for the misdeeds of their attorney. It is unlikely that the le-
gal profession, much less the general public, would accept such an
extreme limitation on the right to bring a claim for attorney fraud.
There is no reason to conclude that the 1887 Legislature intended
to so severely limit the availability of a remedy to enforce the broad
"absolute duty" to permit consultation with counsel that had been
created in the first clause of the statute.
The major difference between the attorney malpractice stat-
ute, and the jailer practice" statute is that a jailer must "for-
feit... $100... to be recovered in a civil proceeding"130 and "an attor-• • • ~,131,, • ,
ney shall be liable to the party injured. The word "forfeit,"
however, does not mean that the "civil action" established in Min-
nesota Statute section 481.10 "has the same thrust"32 as "forfeiture"
procedures under other Minnesota statutes, as asserted by the trial
court. All of the forfeiture statutes, cited by the defendants and
noted by the court, involve criminal prosecutions and civil recovery
actions for items related to the crime, both of which are brought by
the government. 11 Minnesota Statute section 481.10 clearly states
that the civil action may be brought by the "person aggrieved."'
4
In addition, most of the forfeiture statutes specifically use language
that states that the governments civil action arises "after a convic-
tion," "only...by proof of a criminal conviction," or "when a person
is convicted.'
3 5
In sum, the opinion of the Court of Appeals makes clear that
Minnesota Statute section 481.10 imposes criminal liability upon all
129. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 481.07, .071 (1998)).
130. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1998)).
131. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 481.07 (1998)).
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 609.762, subd. 4, 609.5312, subd. 4, 609.905,
subd. 1 (1998)).
134. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1998)).
135. Id. at 767.
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governmental officials, other than those acting pursuant to DOC
policy, for failure to respond to a request to consult with counsel by
any person who is in government custody for any reason. Further,
the court made clear that the "person aggrieved" may bring a civil
action for $100 for each occurrence, whether that official is prose-
cuted or not. 1 6 As a result, the Minnesota courts have clearly rec-
ognized, for the first time, a new enforcement mechanism for the
right of persons in custody to consult counsel upon request in
situations that include those described in Miranda and Dickerson.1
3 7
It is a remedy that far exceeds the suppression of evidence remedy
that Miranda made available and it applies more broadly than
Miranda and Dickerson because it is not limited to interrogation
situations.
As the Supreme Court noted in Prideaux, there is an "absolute
duty" to inform and an absolute obligation to respond to a request,
either by arranging a private consultation or by allowing access to a
telephone. 3 8 Together with the existing requirement under the
Minnesota Constitution that all confessions be recorded to be ad-
missible, a requirement to which only Alaska and Minnesota ad-h 139
here, Minnesota can now justifiably claim to have the most com-
prehensive mechanism for policing the right to consult with
counsel described in Miranda and constitutionalized in Dickerson.'
The implications of these enhanced enforcement possibilities will
be discussed in part five.'
V. THE 2000 AMENDMENTS To MINNESOTA STATUTE SECTION
481.10
The Conciliation Court claim filed by Mr. Ligons did more
than result in an Appeals Court ruling that made enforcement of
Miranda more effective, it also had an effect on the Department of
136. Id. at 769.
137. Id.
138. Prideaux v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 391-94 (Minn.
1976).
139. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994) (citing Stephen v. State,
711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985)). Scales affirmed "that the recording of custo-
dial interrogatories "is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the
adequate protection of the accused's right to counsel, his right against self in-
crimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial." Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
140. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-36 (2000).
141. Infta Part V.
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Corrections' legislative activities. After Mr. Ligons prevailed in his
pro se action, the Department of Corrections not only undertook to
rigorously defend the suit by removing the case to District Court,
the DOC also entered the legislative process in an attempt to
change the language of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 to ex-
empt the Department from future liability under the statute. The
DOC, itself, made clear that it had a legislative strategy to avoid fu-
ture liability in its pleadings in District Court.42 This legislative
strategy was successful in securing amendments to Minnesota Stat-
ute section 481.10 that purport to significantly alter DOC responsi-
bilities under the statute and which remove the DOC from the
reach of its penalties. The amended 481.10 became effective on
August 1, 2000.143
The recently amended Minnesota Statute section 481.10 reads
as follows:
Subd. 1. CONSULTATION. All officers or persons hav-
ing in their custody a person restrained of liberty, except
in cases where imminent danger of escape or injury exists,
shall admit any attorney retained by or on behalf of the
person restrained, or whom the restrained person may de-
sire to consult, to a private interview at the place of cus-
tody. Such custodians, upon request of the person re-
strained, as soon a practicable, and before other
proceedings shall be had, shall notify the attorney of the
request for a consultation with the attorney.
Subd. 2. TELEPHONE ACCESS IN LOCAL CORREC-
TIONAL FACILITIES. Except in cases where imminent
danger of escape or injury exists, all officers or persons
having in their custody a person restrained of liberty
whether or not the person restrained has been charged,
tried, or convicted, shall provide private telephone access
to any attorney retained by or on behalf of the person re-
strained, or whom the restrained person may desire to
consult at no charge to the attorney or to the person re-
strained. Reasonable telephone access under this subdivi-
sion shall be provided following the request of the person
142. Appellant's Opening Brief at A56-59, Mullins, 616 N.W.2d 764 (2000) (re-
ferring to the DOC's Informational Statement at A58-59 where the DOC discusses
its plans to propose legislation regarding inmate telephone access). The DOC re-
served the right to rescind removal of the Conciliation Court case based on the
possibility that the 2000 Legislative Session would amend Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 481.10, excluding the DOC from liability. Id.
143. MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1998) (amended by 2000 MINN. LAWS. 408).
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restrained and before other proceedings shall be had re-
garding the alleged offense causing custody.
Subd. 3. TELEPHONE ACCESS IN STATE CORREC-
TIONAL FACILITIES. Except in cases where imminent
danger of escape or injury exists, all officers or persons
having in their custody.a person restrained of liberty while
serving an executed sentence in a state correctional facil-
ity, shall provide private telephone access to any attorney
retained by or on behalf of the person restrained, or
whom the restrained person may desire to consult at no
charge to the attorney or to the person restrained. Tele-
phone access under this subdivision shall be provided following
the request of the person restrained and in accordance with poli-
cies adopted by the institution that meet constitutional require-
ments.
Subd. 4. CRIMINAL PENALTY.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), whoever violates
subdivision 1 or 2 is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall also
forfeit $100 to the person aggrieved, to be recovered in a
civil action.
(b) The penalties described in paragraph (b) do not apply to offi-
cers or persons having in their custody persons restrained of liberty
while serving and executed sentence in a state correctional facil-
ity.'
Perhaps the most striking feature of the amended statute is
how little has been changed by the Legislature. The entire first
clause, which the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted in
Prideaux as creating an "absolute duty" to (1) notify a "person re-
strained" of their right to consult with counsel on request, (2) no-
tify the attorney of the request "as soon as practicable and before
other proceedings," and (3) "admit... the attorney to a private in-
terview at the place of custody" remains unchanged as Subdivision
one. 45  This is the same language that the Prideaux Court held
could be "vindicated" by providing access to a telephone to allow
the person restrained to call an attorney. 146 Under this clause ofthe statute, it appears that the "absolute duty" to arrange a private
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 1 (1998) (amended by 2000 MINN. LAWS.
408).
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interview or a phone call remains unchanged; refusing to respond
to a request for a "private interview" with counsel, or conditioning a
response on a law enforcement official's exercise of discretion of
any sort is still not an option.
The second clause, which applies only to persons restrained in
county and municipal facilities, clarifies some aspects of the tele-
phone access question by using the same language used in the
original statute that Prideaux held created an "absolute duty" to al-
low private telephone access to attorneys on request.147 It also re-
tains the cost shifting feature of the 1991 amendment by requiring
that the calls must also be free of charge. 14 However, unlike the
"consultation clause" these telephone calls must occur "before other
proceedings regarding the alleged offense causing custody."149  The "as
soon as practicable" language has been removed. But since Schabert
held that "other proceedings" included interrogations, this clause
would still apply to all situations in which Miranda and Dickerson
would also apply, although it is not clear how the absence of the "as
soon as practicable" language would effect the response time for
other sorts of proceedings.
Subdivision three speaks to the obligation of the Department
of Corrections to provide telephone access to attorneys. Under this
subdivision, "private telephone access" appears to be mandatory in
some general fashion, but there is no requirement that DOC offi-
cials respond to a request for a phone call,'150 as they are obligated
to respond to a request for "private interview" consultations with
counsel in subdivision one. Although this section does not man-
date that DOC officials respond to a request for an attorney phone
call, it does require that regulations for responding to requests for
attorney phone calls must meet "constitutional requirements."
52
In addition to differentiating between the obligations of the
DOC and local officials to respond to requests for attorney phone
calls, by far the most important change in the statute is embodied
in subdivision four. Although the statute retains the same penalties
that were held to be independent remedies by the Court of Appeals
in Mullins v. Churchill, 5 paragraph (b) specifically excludes the
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
149. State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1944).
150. MINN. STAT § 481.10, subd. 2 (amended by 2000 MINN. LAWS 408).
151. Id. at subd. 1.
152. Id. at subd. 3.
153. Mullins. v. Churchill, 616 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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Department of Corrections officers from both the criminal and
civil liability imposed by Minnesota Statute section 481.10.15' How-
ever, subdivision 4 does not change the liability for any other law
enforcement officials in the state.
In the future it will be necessary to determine how the manda-
tory attorney notification and private consultation language in sub-
division one, which Prideaux has held requires mandatory tele-
phone access in lieu of a private meeting at the place of
confinement, will im act the interpretation of the amended tele-
phone access clauses. And, the telephone policies that may be
instituted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to "constitu-
tional requirements" will have to be explored in future proceed-
ings. With respect to the penalty clause, it seems that the criminal
and civil penalties that previously applied to all officials holding
persons in custody, no longer apply to the DOC personnel. 
5 7
This means that the impact of Mullins v. Churchill, as a means
of enforcing Miranda and deterring abuses of the right to consult
with counsel, remains unchanged as it relates to all other law en-
forcement personnel in that state. Thus, even after the recent
amendment, law enforcement officials in Minnesota who violate a
request for counsel during interrogation continue to be subject to
criminal prosecution under Minnesota Statute section 481.101" for
refusing to respond to requests for counsel in most of the situations
in which Miranda and Dickerson apply-custodial interrogations.
VI. THE RIGHT To CONSULT WITH COUNSEL IN MINNESOTA: A
CASE STUDY
Minnesota v. Jenson15 9 arose out of the efforts of Goodhue
County law enforcement officials to solve an open investigation in-
volving the disappearance and suspected homicide of a young
154. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 4.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Prideaux v. Minn. Dept of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 394
(Minn. 1976).
157. Supra note 6; see also MINN. STAT§ 481.10, subd. 4.
158. Supra note 6; see also MINN. STAT § 481.10, subd. 4. Subdivision four of the
statute specifically exempts only the staff member of correctional institutions and
nowhere makes any attempt to exclude other law enforcement officials. MINN.
STAT. § 481.10, subd. 4.
159. Minnesota v. Jenson, (referring to the 1995 murder case involving the
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child. The investigators had focused on the mother's live-in com-
panion, Dale Jenson, as the prime suspect. However, a body had
never been discovered and there was insufficient evidence to
prosecute either the mother or Mr. Jenson.lW
Goodhue County officers secured the services of a nationally
recognized interrogation expert from the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 161 Jenson was questioned by the
FBI agent in a closed room in a police facility and, after several
hours of questioning by the FBI agent, he admitted having acciden-162
tally killed the child and led officers to the scene. Because of the
apparently effective work of the FBI agent, Jenson was charged with
the homicide and a public defender was appointed to represent
him. 163
Pursuant to usual practice in Minnesota, the public defender
made a motion for a copy of the tape recording of the confes-
sion. 64 This is not a motion that would have been made had this
case arisen in Federal Court where cases investigated by the FBI
160. Richard Meryhew, New Lead Possible In Jessica Swanson Case, Police Say, MIN-
NEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Nov. 13, 1997, at 7B (stating investigators continued to focus
on Dale jenson in theJune 27, 1995, disappearance of three-year-oldJessica Swan-
son; police remained unsatisfied with information provided by Swanson and
Jenson); Maria Elena Baca, Tipster's Account of Jessica Swanson Case Investigated,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Nov. 25, 1997, at 2B (stating source indicated girl died
from a fall off a counter top in her home and alleges Dale Jenson disposed of her
body; investigators still seeking additional information).
161. Burcum, supra note 162 and accompanying text. Burcum notes local au-
thorities sought assistance from FBI agent Dan Craft. Craft had "a reputation as a
good interviewer." Id. BCA director, Nick O'Hara stated, "He [Craft] wouldn't
have been invited in to help with the [Jenson] investigation unless he had an ex-
cellent reputation." Id. Craft had been recognized for his questioning of serial
killer Jeffrey Dahmer in 1991, and Harold (Howie) Kramer, Jr. in relation to
Kramer's leaving his three-year-old son in the woods to die. Id. See also Chuck
Haga, Interrogator's Skills Help Crack The Case, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 17,
1999, at 1A. FBI agent Craft's skills were compared to that of the great interroga-
tors," intimating Goodhue County officials had almost given up hope of solving
the four year old disappearance ofJessica Swanson. Id.
162. Jill Burcum, Jenson 's Attorney Says His Confession Should Be Thrown Out,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Sep. 2, 1999, at IA; (stating the FBI interrogator ignored
Jenson's repeated requests to speak to an attorney).
163. Id.; see also infra note 164 and accompanying text.
164. Jill Burcum, Sheriff. Confession Dispute Not Unusual, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Sep. 3, 1999, at 2B. Goodhue County Sheriff Dean Albers and the Minne-
sota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) jointly decided to seek the assis-
tance of FBI agent Dan Craft in questioning Dale Jenson. Id. The interview with
Jenson lasted approximately two hours culminating in Jenson's confession. Id.
Audio taped copies of the interview were reviewed by both the prosecution and
the defense counsels. Id.
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usually are tried. 16 Nor would it have been made in any state of the
Union other than Alaska. This is because only two states, Minne-
sota and Alaska, require confessions to be recorded to be admissi-
ble at trial.'66 As a result, in most jurisdictions in which the FBI
agent usually works, tape recordings are not made of interrogation
sessions and the details of the interrogation session must be de-
scribed in court testimony by FBI agents or other law enforcement
officials who were present at the time of the confession.
Because of the special Minnesota taping requirement, a tape
recording revealed exactly what had happened during the interro-
gation of Mr. Jenson. When the public defender received the tape,
she heard Mr. Jenson reqiuesting to speak with a lawyer on no less
than fourteen occasions. She also heard the FBI agent ignore the
requests, or refuse to respond to the requests, each time the re-
quest for an attorney was made by Jenson. Only after these re-
peated violations of Miranda and Minnesota Statute section 481.10,
didJenson make the incriminating statements. 16s
Tape recording made it possible for the court to determine
that Jenson's Miranda rights had been repeatedly violated and the
statements were properly ruled inadmissible.' 69 However, because
of other evidence, Jenson eventually pleaded guilty to a lesser of-• -- 170
fense and was incarcerated. Goodhue County engaged the ser-
vices of an independent Washington County prosecutor to investi-
gate the actions of the FBI agent and, presumably, the Goodhue
County officers with whom the agent worked. Following the inves-
tigation, the independent prosecutor publicly announced that the
FBI agent had, in fact, violated Jenson's request to speak with an
attorney on numerous occasions, but that there were no Minnesota
statutes under which he could be held accountable for the constitu-
165. Burcum, supra note 161 and accompanying text (stating interrogation
audio-tapes are required in only two states); see also State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,
591 (1994) (citing Stephen v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985).
166. Burcum, supra note 161 and accompanying text.
167. Id. Public Defender Mary Winfield stated during the interrogation that
the FBI agent "brushed off"Jenson's requests for counsel, promising to get him an
attorney, but never did. Id. Nor did the agent givejenson access to a telephone to
call an attorney. Id.
168. Id.
169. Infranotes 174, 175, 180.
170. Richard Meryhew, Strategy injenson Confession Criticized, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Apr. 25, 2000 at IA. Jenson pled guilty to second-degree manslaughter in
the death ofJessica Swanson and is presently serving a six-year sentence. Id.
[Vol. 27:2
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tional violations he had committed.
17'
VII. ANALYSIS OF MINNESOTA V. JENSON
Following the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Dickerson, it is quite clear that the Dakota County District Court
properly refused to allow the statements taken fromJenson into evi-
dence. But, the Jenson case also reveals how critically important the
Minnesota "recorded confession" rule is for courts to be able to
have a factual record upon which to rule on the admissibility of
confessions taken by police from persons in custody."72 It seems fair
to surmise that, had the tape recording not existed, the court
would have had to base its ruling on reconstructions of the events
based on the memories of those present: principally the FBI agent
who had broken the law, the officers who witnessed the violations
and did not reported them, and the defendant.
According to Hennepin County Chief Judge Kevin Burke, the
value of the Minnesota "recorded confession" rule is that it makes it
much easier for trial judges to rule correctly on suppression mo-
tions. 73 Because the factual basis upon which to decide the admis-
sibility of recorded confessions is less subject to the vagaries of
memory, perception, and the bias that is inherent in the "often
competitive practice of law enforcement""7 that inevitably effects
all reconstructions of interrogations that need not be recorded, it is
likely that the Minnesota "recorded confession" rule provides
greater accuracy in the application of Miranda and Dickerson. The
Jenson case is an example of the value of the recorded confession
rule to insure accurate judicial decision-making.
In addition, the Jenson case also gives some indication that the
very existence of the rule may have a deterrent effect on law en-
forcement officials who might be inclined to violate their obliga-
171. Id. The Washington County Prosecutor stated that the FBI agent's actions
were "[t]he most blatant violations of the U.S. Constitution I've seen," but con-
cluded that "no state laws were broken." Id.
172. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994) (citing Alaska's
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985).
173. Almanac (MN Public Television broadcast, Fri. Sep. 17, 1999) (panel dis-
cussion, in which the author and The Honorable Kevin Burke were participants,
concerning the confession of Dalejenson).
174. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). The United States
Supreme Court recognized that "the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime" is not a neutral party and that judicial oversight
is necessary because of the very nature of the investigative process. Id.
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tion to uphold the Constitution. Of course, it is possible that the
FBI agent's violations of Miranda were part of a strategy to get the
information, irrespective of whether it could be used to secure a
conviction. 'Just knowing what happened to the body," even if
prosecution was not possible, may have been the agent's motivation
for intentionally violating the Constitution. "' Whatever the moti-
vation of the FBI agent or other officers who were aware of the
techniques he employed, the Jenson case reveals an inherent weak-
ness in the deterrent value of suppression of evidence as a means of
preventing violations of Miranda or Dickerson.
Suppression of illegally obtained statements may cause a case
to be lost at trial 76 and in some instances law enforcement officials
may decide that getting the information is more important than be-
ing able to use that information to convict. In such circumstances,
suppression of evidence can have little, if any deterrent impact.
However, suppression of statements can have a deterrent effect
only if the persons present at the interrogation report that the inter-
rogation was conducted in an improper manner. Also, law en-
forcement agencies often evaluate the performance of individual
officers on their success in closing cases by arrest, irrespective of
whether the evidence upon which a an arrest is based can be admit-
ted at trial or results in a conviction. Thus, individual law enforce-
ment officials rarely have to consider being held personally respon-
sible if they fail to uphold their Constitutional duties. This fact of
life makes the provisions of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 ex-
tremely important as an additional protection for the rights de-
scribed in Miranda and Dickerson.
The most unique aspect of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 is
that it establishes individual responsibility for law enforcement offi-
cials in a way that merely suppressing statements cannot. For ex-
ample, had the FBI agent been aware not only that his violations of
Miranda were being recorded but that he would also be personally
175. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591 (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1158 (demonstrating
only Minnesota and Alaska require taped interviews)); see also FBI Agent Says He
Had Officials' Approval to Deny Jenson Lawyer, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 6, 2000,
at 2B. FBI agent Dan Craft contended that he asked local authorities how far he
should push "the envelope." Id. Craft maintained he pursued theJenson confes-
sion out of the desire to find the missing child and that he always "plays by the
rules-except in this case." Id. Contrary to Craft's testimony, Goodhue County
Attorney Stephen Betcher stated he had advised Craft to giveJenson his Miranda
rights and record everything. Id.
176. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592.
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subject to criminal prosecution for each incident in which he re-
fused or ignored a request for counsel, the incentives for the FBI
agent to follow the dictates of the United State Supreme Court
would have been greatly enhanced.
Of course, in order for a prosecution to occur under Minne-
sota Statute section 481.10, another law enforcement official, such
as the Washington County prosecutor in the Jenson case, must ex-
ercise his or her discretion to file criminal charges against fellow
law enforcement officials.'77 Despite the existence of a Minnesota
statute that over 100 years has criminalized actions such as those of
the FBI agent in the Jenson case for, he was not charged. As a re-
sult, the Jenson case makes clear that imposing criminal sanctions
on law enforcement officials is dependent upon considerations
other than whether clear evidence exists that a law enforcement of-
ficer has committed more than a dozen criminal acts.""
Whatever the basis of the decision not to prosecute the FBI
agent, the Jenson case reveals the importance of Mullins v. Churchill
in establishing that the civil remedy under Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 481.10 is not dependent upon a criminal conviction.'7 If the
civil remedy in Minnesota Statute section 481.10 was dependent
not only on a charge being filed, but on a conviction on that
charge, the civil remedy would be so tenuous as to be virtually
meaningless, and any deterrent effect that the Legislature might
have intended to create would have been rendered a nullity. After
Mullins v. Churchill, it is now clear that Mr. Jenson retains a civil
cause of action for each of the violations committed by the FBI
agent, as well as potential causes of action against each officer that
was aware of the requests for counsel and failed to respond. s
177. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 4; Mullins v. Churchill, 616 N.W.2d 764, 767
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
178. Infra Part I11A.
179. Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 767 (stating MINN. STAT. § 481.10 "prescribes both
criminal and civil remedies; neither of which is a prerequisite to the other").
180. Id. Since Mr. Jenson's involvement action did not include the DOC staff
members exempted under Minnesota Statute section 481.10, subd. 4, the Court of
Appeals opinion in Mullins has supplied Jenson the grounds for a civil cause of ac-
tion. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that a sec-
ondary effect of the "constitutionalization" of Miranda and Dickerson is availability
of attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1988 violations of the
right to consult with counsel under Miranda and Minnesota Statute section 481.10.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Under Minnesota Statute section 481.10, all law enforcement
officials in the State of Minnesota have an "absolute duty" to re-
spond to a request to speak with a lawyer by any person in their cus-
tody by contacting a lawyer and setting up a private interview and
that failure to do so creates both criminal and civil liability. 8 ' This
right to consult with counsel can be "vindicated" by either a private
consultation in the place of confinement, or by making telephone
access to counsel available in a "reasonably" confidential setting.182
The recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Mullins v. Chur-
chill confirms that the criminal penalty and the civil remedy are in-
dependent remedies and that the person aggrieved may bring a
civil cause of action for $100 irrespective of whether a criminal-- • / 183
conviction has been obtained. Although recent amendments
may have limited the availability of remedies for Department of
Corrections personnel, all other law enforcement officials are
clearly subject to the penalties imposed by Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 481.10. 84
This statute applies to the custody and interrogation settings in
which the United States Supreme Court has recognized a presump-
tion of coerciveness which under Miranda and Dickerson require law
enforcement officers to provide warnings that include the right to
consult with counsel.185 And, like Miranda and Dickerson, Minnesota
Statute section 481.10 requires consultation with counsel to be pro-. 186
vided before questioning can continue. However, in addition to
suppression of any statements taken in violation of this right to
consult with counsel, Minnesota Statute section 481.10 permits in-. 187
dividual officers to be held criminally and civilly liable.Because the Minnesota Constitution requires that confessions
181. State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 1944); State v. Palmer, 191
N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. 1971); Prideaux v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 247
N.W.2d 385, 391-92, 394 (Minn. 1976).
182. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Kneisl, 251 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Minn. 1977);
Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Held, 246 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. 1976); Prideaux,
247 N.W.2d at 391-92, 394.
183. Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 767.
184. MINN. STAT. § 481.10, subd. 4 (Supp. 1998) (amended 2000 MINN. LAWS
408).
185. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-36 (2000); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
186. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d at 589.
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must be recorded to be admitted at trial 18 and Minnesota Statute
section 481.10 has been interpreted to impose individual criminal
and civil liability on law enforcement officers for violation of the
right to consult with counsel,' s9 the courts of Minnesota have cre-
ated a more effective means of enforcing the rights enunciated in
Miranda, and for deterring violations of those rights, than any other
state in the nation. 90 The Jenson case, in which an FBI agent who
clearly committed multiple violations of Miranda during an inter-
rogation that was taped, demonstrates the value of the "recorded
confession" rule.'9' However, the fact that the FBI agent in the
Jenson case was not prosecuted under Minnesota Statute section
481.10 demonstrates that the separate civil penalties brought by the
"person aggrieved," which was recognized by the Minnesota Court
of Appeals in Mullins v. Churchill,19 is a necessary addition to the
enforcement mechanism for jurisdictions, like Minnesota, that are
serious about making the protections of Miranda and Dickerson truly
effective.
In jurisdictions which lack the recording requirement, it is im-
possible to determine whether the factual basis upon which sup-
pression decisions are made are accurate, given the adversarial na-
ture of the process and the fact that often only law enforcement
officials and the accused can describe what occurred in the closed
room where the interrogation occurred. The failure of law en-
forcement officials to prosecute the FBI agent who committed nu-
merous violations of Minnesota Statute section 481.10 in the Jenson
case demonstrates why other jurisdictions that are committed to
protecting the Miranda right-to-counsel that was recently reinforced
in Dickerson could well benefit from adopting criminal and civil
remedies for violations of Miranda that now exist in Minnesota, in
addition to suppression of evidence.
188. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
189. Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 767.
190. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592; Mullins, 616 N.W.2d at 767. See also Margaret
Zack, Miranda Error Frees Suspect In Homicide, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 26,
2000, at 2B (stating Perry D. Skinaway, Jr.'s statement had to be suppressed be-
cause the Miranda warning he was given was interrupted and considered insuffi-
cient).
191. Burcum, supra notes 162, 167 and accompanying text. The fact that the
tapes clearly depicted Jenson requested a lawyer fourteen times is irrefutable evi-
dence that is not subject to memory interpretation at a later hearing regarding the
circumstances that may have transpired. See also supra note 180 and accompanying
text.
192. 616 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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